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DUE PROCESS AND PSYCHIATRIC
ASSISTANCE: AKE v. OKLAHOMA
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most cherished legal concepts of Anglo-American juris-
prudence is "due process of law." Its viability and utility, however, as a
safeguard against arbitrary intrusion by the state spring not from its fixed
and impregnable meaning but from the flexibility with which it has been
applied in the American judicial system. As Justice Felix Frankfurter
once noted, great legal concepts like due process of law "were purposely
left to gather meaning from experience."'
At its most basic level, due process has come to mean that the gov-
ernment may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without the
implementation of fair procedures to achieve those desired ends.' Proce-
dural due process in criminal adjudication has traditionally consisted of
an adversary hearing in which each participant is responsible for present-
ing favorable evidence to an impartial decision-maker.3 This decision-
maker, usually a jury, evaluates the evidence in light of pre-existing legal
standards and makes a determination as to guilt.4
In a system of justice based on an adversarial presentation of evi-
dence, indigency poses special problems.' In short, the criminal trial can
be a meaningless ritual for an indigent defendant who lacks the basic
resources to fully participate in the trial. A trial under such circum-
stances not only offends traditional notions of "fairness" and "equality"
but perhaps more importantly undermines the truth-finding function of
the process itself.6
1. National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). "Great concepts like. . . 'due process of law,' 'liberty,' [and] 'prop-
erty' were purposely left to gather meaning from experience. For they relate to the whole domain of
social and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well that only a
stagnant society remains unchanged." Id.
2. See J. NovAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTrTUTONAL LAW 527 (2d ed. 1983).
3. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6, at 23-25 (1985).
4. Id.
5. Id. § 1.6, at 30-31. See also Lewin, Indigency-Informal and Formal Procedures to Provide
Partisan Psychiatric Assistance to the Poor, 52 IowA L. REv. 458, 487 (1966) (discussing the dichot-
omy between an indigent's right to assert the defense of insanity and an indigent's effective loss of
that right based solely on the indigent's status as an indigent).
6. See W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 1.6, at 24.
The superiority of the adversary process in producing accurate verdicts rests on two prem-
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In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has played a dom-
inant role in ensuring that indigent defendants have the basic resources
with which to participate in their trials.' In particular, an indigent's
right to assistance of legal counsel has been firmly established in various
areas of the criminal justice system."
The scope of an indigent defendant's right to be provided with other
types of forensic assistance has never been definitively answered by the
Court. The Court's recent decision in Ake v. Oklahoma9 furnishes a par-
tial answer in its holding that an indigent defendant must be provided
with psychiatric assistance in certain situations.
The analysis that follows will critically examine the Ake decision
and its implications as both precedent and policy for future development
of law in the area of forensic assistance. Specific recommendations will
also be made for implementation of the right to psychiatric assistance,
since the right recognized in Ake is not self-executing.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 15, 1979, Glen Burton Ake and Steve Hatch quit their
jobs as oil drillers and went in search of a house to burglarize.10 That
evening they stopped at the home of the Reverend and Mrs. Douglass,
and gained access under the ruse of being lost and needing to use the
ises. First, it is argued that the adversaries will uncover more facts and transmit more
useful information to the decision-maker.. .. Second, it is argued that the adversary
system avoids... decisionmaker bias ....
Id. REPORT OF Ar'Y GEN'S. COMM. ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JuSTIcE (1963).
It follows that insofar as the financial status of the accused impedes vigorous and proper
challenges, it constitutes a threat to the viability of the adversary system. . .. It is also
clear that a situation in which persons are required to contest a serious accusation but are
denied access to the tools of contest is offensive to fairness and equity.
Id. at 11. See also Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrist, and the Insanity De-
fense, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1962) ("[TIhe [adversary] model presupposes that the parties
are roughly comparable in legal, investigative, and expert resources.").
Although the expansion of indigent rights has slowed as the Court has become more conserva-
tive, the Court has shown a continued sensitivity to the functioning of the adversary process when its
truthfinding aspects are involved. See, eg., Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
7. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
9. 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985). The term "psychiatric assistance" as used in this Note refers to
both psychiatric and psychological assistance. However, many federal circuits and states do not
accept psychological assistance on an equal basis with psychiatric assistance. See Comment, The
Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom?, 38 MD. L. REv. 539 (1979). Psychologi-
cal testimony has been accepted in Oklahoma. See Rogers v. State, 634 P.2d 743 (Okla. Crim. App.
1981); Carter v. State, 376 P.2d 351 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962).
10. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1099.
[Vol. 21:121
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phone.11 After both men rummaged the house for valuables, attempted
to rape twelve-year-old Leslie Douglass, and tied up the members of the
family, Ake sent Hatch to the car and then shot all four members of the
Douglass family.12 The Reverend and Mrs. Douglass subsequently died.
The two Douglass children, Brooks and Leslie, freed themselves, drove
to the home of a nearby doctor, and called the police. 3
Ake and Hatch fled through Arkansas, Tennessee, Louisiana, Texas,
California, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming before being apprehended in
Colorado.14 Subsequent to his arrest, Ake was extradited to
Oklahoma,15 and while in the El Reno, Oklahoma jail, Ake requested to
speak to the sheriff. 6 Shortly thereafter, Ake gave a forty-four page con-
fession regarding the robbery and shootings of the Douglass family.
17
On February 14, 1980, four months after the incident, Ake was ar-
raigned in the Oklahoma District Court for Canadian County. 8 The
judge found Ake's behavior at the hearing to be "bizarre" and sua sponte
ordered a competency evaluation.' 9 Ake was diagnosed as a paranoid
schizophrenic with delusional tendencies.20 On April 10, 1980, Dr. R.D.
Garcia, the chief forensic psychiatrist at the Eastern State Hospital in
Vinita, Oklahoma, reported to the court that Ake was not competent to
stand trial.2 ' Six weeks later, Dr. Garcia reported that Ake was then
competent to stand trial, and that his competency could be maintained
through regular doses of thorazine, an antipsychotic medication. 2
11. Ake v. Oklahoma, 663 P.2d 1, 4 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
12. Id. Months later, after being apprehended, Ake gave a detailed forty-four page confession




16. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1100.
17. Ake, 663 P.2d at 8. On appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Ake alleged
error in the admission of the confession because his insanity rendered the confession involuntary.
The court rejected this argument primarily because they ultimately found that he had not raised a
reasonable doubt as to the sanity issue. Id.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1090. Examination for competency involves a determination of present
sanity, while an examination for the purposes of an insanity plea involves a determination of sanity
at the time of the offense. See R. ROESCH & S. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL (1980);
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HALTH STANDARDS 139, 259 (First Tenative Draft 1983).
20. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1090-91.
21. Id. at 1091.
22. Id. Thorazine is a common medication for psychotic patients. Antipsychotic medication
restores mentation by reducing auditory hallucinations, delusions, and disordered thought patterns.
When used in excess, however, it acts as a sedative. See Gutheil & Appelbaum, "Mind Control,"
"Synthetic Sanity," "Artificial Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of
Antipsychotic Medication, 12 Ho sTRA L. REv. 77, 79 (1983).
On appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Ake alleged error in his sedation
1985]
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At a pre-trial conference in June, Ake's appointed counsel requested
funds with which to pay a psychiatrist, or in the alternative, to have Ake
examined by a court appointed psychiatrist.23 The court denied the mo-
tion, and stated it had no responsibility to provide such assistance to
criminal defendants. 4
Ake was tried for two counts of first degree murder and two counts
of shooting with intent to kill.25 The state sought the death penalty for
both murder counts.2 6 The fact that Ake committed the acts was uncon-
tested at trial, and Ake's sole defense was a plea of insanity.2 The
defense called the three psychiatrists who had previously examined Ake
for competency. 9 Each psychiatrist testified that Ake was mentally il, 30
but none could testify as to Ake's mental condition at the time of the
incident since Ake was not evaluated for sanity at the time of the of-
fense.31 The defense rested its case without calling any lay witnesses to
testify as to Ake's sanity.32
The judge instructed the jury that under Oklahoma law a defendant
is presumed to be sane at the time of the offense unless the defendant
raises a reasonable doubt as to his sanity.3 3 Once a reasonable doubt is
throughout the trial. Specifically, Ake argued that his "zombie-like" condition, which resulted from
the thorazine, rendered him incapable of communicating with counsel and prejudiced him in front of
the jury. Ake, 663 P.2d at 6. The court rejected this argument and stated, "we have no reason to
believe the appellant's behavior was caused by any factor other than his own volition." Id. at 7. In a
footnote, the court noted that Ake may have been feigning to gain support for his insanity plea. Id.
at 7 n.4.
23. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1091.
24. Ake, 663 P.2d at 6. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. The court cited Irwin v.
State, 617 P.2d 588 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) when it rejected Ake's constitutional claim. In Irwin,
the court had rejected a similar constitutional claim and had noted that the United States Supreme
Court had held that the denial of such assistance was not a constitutional violation, citing to United
States ex rel Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
25. Ake, 663 P.2d at 6.
26. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1092.





32. Id. In Oklahoma, lay testimony is admissible on the issue of insanity. Wilson v. State, 568
P.2d 1279 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); High v. State, 401 P.2d 189 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965). However,
the probative value of such testimony when compared to expert testimony is questionable. See infra
notes 129-52 and accompanying text.
33. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1091-92.
Title 21, section 152 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides:
All persons are capable of committing crimes, except those belonging to the following
classes, . . . (4) Lunatics, insane persons, and all persons of unsound mind, including
persons temporarily or partially deprived of reason, upon proof that at the time of commit-
ting the act charged against them they were incapable of knowing its wrongfulness.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 152 (1981). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted this
4
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raised, the burden of proof then shifts to the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense.34
After deliberation the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.35
At the sentencing stage of the trial, neither the prosecution nor the
defense presented any new evidence.36 The prosecution relied on the pre-
vious testimony of the three psychiatrists who on cross examination
stated that Ake was "dangerous" and probably would commit future vio-
lent acts.37 The jury found three aggravating factors, one of which was
future dangerousness.3" Ake received the death penalty for the two
counts of murder and five hundred years for each count of shooting with
intent to kill. 3 9 Ake's motion for a new trial was denied and he was
sentenced in accordance with the jury verdict.4'
The case was then appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals where nineteen errors were asserted. 41 The appellate court rejected
statutory language as creating an initial presumption of sanity which, if overcome, shifts the burden
of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt to the state. See Rogers v. State, 634 P.2d 743, 744
(Okla. Crim. App. 1981).
34. Ake, 105 S. CL at 1091-92.
35. Id. at 1092.
36. Id.
37. Id. Predictions of future dangerousness are scientifically dubious. See infra notes 57 & 204.
The Supreme Court has held that future dangerousness is an acceptable aggravating factor in a
criminal sentencing proceeding. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976); and has held that
expert psychiatric testimony is admissible on the issue. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). In
Barefoot, the Court rejected the argument of the American Psychiatric Association as amicus that
expert testimony concerning future dangerousness should be constitutionally barred because of its
unreliability. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899.
38. Ake, 663 P.2d at 11. The other two aggravating circumstances found by the jury were:
"(1) mhat the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel; [and] (2) that the murders were
committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or prosecution." Id. See also OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 701.12 (1981) (in Oklahoma aggravating circumstances include: (1) A prior felony involving a
threat of violence; (2) knowingly creating a great risk of death to more than one person; (3) murder
by remuneration or employing another to commit murder by remuneration; (4) murder that was
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel; (5) murder for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or prosecution; (6) murder committed while imprisoned upon a conviction of a felony; (7) abil-
ity for future criminal acts of violence; or (8) murder of a peace officer).
39. Ake, 105 S. CL at 1092.
40. Id. At the time the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided Ake, a defendant in a
criminal case was required to preserve all issues in the motion for a new trial. Stevenson v. State, 637
P.2d 878 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981). Recently, this rule was statutorily modified. New section 1054.1
reads:
The right of a party to perfect an appeal from a judgment, order or decree of the trial court
to the Court of Criminal Appeals shall not be conditioned upon his having filed in the trial
court a motion for a new trial, but in the event a motion for a new trial is filed in the trial
court by a party adversely affected by the judgment, order or decree, no appeal to the
Court of Criminal Appeals may be taken until subsequent to the ruling by the trial court
on the motion for a new trial.
S.B. No. 187, 1985 Okla. Sess. Laws - (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1054.1).
41. Ake, 663 P.2d at 10.
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all nineteen errors, including Ake's assertion that the state was legally
responsible for providing a psychiatrist for an indigent charged with a
capital crime when the defendant's sanity was at issue. 2 The judgment
was affirmed in toto.
The United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari specif-
ically addressing two issues:
(1) Where indigent defendant's sanity at time of offense is seri-
ously in issue, can state constitutionally refuse to provide any opportu-
nity whatsoever for him to obtain expert psychiatric examination
necessary to prepare and establish his insanity defense and to present
evidence in mitigation of punishment and in rebuttal of alleged aggra-
vating offense of predicted future violence proven by state through psy-
chiatric testimony? (2) Can state constitutionally force criminal
defendant to be heavily sedated with Thorazine while attending crimi-
nal proceedings against him in absence of any evidence that he failed to
conduct himself properly in court?43
III. THE AKE DECISION
Eight Supreme Court Justices held that a state must provide an indi-
gent defendant whose sanity is likely to be a significant factor at trial
access to a competent psychiatrist for the purposes of examination, and
42. Id. at 6.
43. Ake v. Oklahoma, 663 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3041
(July 31, 1984) (No. 83-5424). Because the Court held that the denial of psychiatric assistance
violated due process, the Court did not reach the forced competency issue. The issue of forced
competency has been the subject of intense controversy. See Appelbaum & Gutheil, "Rotting With
Their Rights On':" Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusals by Psychiatric Pa-
tients, 7 BULL. Am. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 308 (1979); Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 22
passim; Winick, Psychotropic Drugs and Competence to Stand Trial, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 769 (1979); Comment, Madness and Medicine: The Forcible Administration of Psycho-
tropic Drugs, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 497.
At trial Ake stared vacantly into space in a zombie-like condition and did not communicate
with his legal counsel. Ake, 663 P.2d at 7-8. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals intimated
that Ake's behavior was purposeful and designed to buttress his insanity defense. However, the
defendant's contention that the behavior was caused by the psychotropic drug thorazine is a more
plausible explanation. Psychotropic drugs are widely recognized as drugs which cause apathy and a
lack of movement and speech. See Van Putten & May, "A Kinetic Depression" in Schizophrenia, 35
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1101 (1978).
In Ake, the behavior raised two constitutional problems. First, did Ake's zombie-like behavior
unfairly prejudice him in front of the jury? Although the Court has never expressly passed on the
issue in the context of drug-induced competency, in other situations the Court has held that the
defendant may not be presented in front of thejury in a prejudicial manner. Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501, 504-05 (1976); and the jury may not be deprived of the opportunity to assess the defend-
ant's demeanor and character. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973).
Second, was Ake deprived of his right to counsel? The Court has held that a defendant cannot
be tried unless the defendant can understand and intelligently participate in the trial. This mandate
includes the ability to consult and assist in the preparation stage of trial. Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 171-72, 179-82 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384-87 (1966).
6
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assistance in the evaluation, preparation, and presentation stages of the
defense.44 The Court also concluded that a state must provide access to a
psychiatrist in a capital sentencing proceeding when a state presents psy-
chiatric evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness.45
A. Due Process Balancing Test
The Court applied a three-prong due process balancing test in its
analysis and concluded that a psychiatrist is required under certain cir-
cumstances.46 The balancing test focuses on the private interest affected
by state law, the state's interest affected by the recognition of additional
procedural safeguards, and the probable value of additional safeguards,
including an assessment of the risk of erroneous deprivation of the pri-
vate interest.47
In its application of the due process balancing test to the issue of
psychiatric assistance when sanity was likely to be a significant factor at
trial, the Court characterized the private interest as "uniquely compel-
ling" considering the defendant's obvious stake in the outcome of the
case.
48
In contrast, the state's interest was characterized as "not substan-
tial."'49 Specifically, the Court rejected Oklahoma's contention that the
costs of providing psychiatric assistance would be a "staggering- burden"
to states.50 Moreover, the Court noted that the state's interest in prevail-
ing at trial is tempered by the "fair and accurate adjudication of criminal
cases."
51
44. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1097.
45. Id. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted that the majority's discussion of the necessity for
psychiatric testimony in the sentencing stage of a trial could be treated as dicta given the majority's
holding with respect to the right to psychiatric assistance in the guilt phase of a trial. Id. at 1101.
However, the majority does not treat the discussion as dicta, and in view of the Court's full consider-
ation of the issue, its treatment as such would be imprudent.
46. Id. at 1094-97.
47. Id. at 1094. The three-prong due process balancing test is one of the most significant devel-
opments of modem constitutional law. First explicitly used by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the test is basically two part. First, has the aggrieved party been deprived
by the government of a constitutionally recognizable liberty or property interest? Second, if so, what
are the costs and benefits of changing the status quo? The Mathews test has been used extensively in
the administrative law area.
There are a number of problems with this type of balancing approach, not the least of which is
the Court's lack of articulation of the values and assumptions which make this type of non-empirical
cost-benefit analysis credible.
48. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1094.
49. Id. at 1095.
50. Id. at 1094.
51. Id. at 1095.
1985]
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Turning to the third factor, the Court emphasized the "pivotal" role
of psychiatry in the modern criminal trial." In particular, the Court
determined that a psychiatrist can be crucial in providing a jury with the
necessary information with which to make an accurate determination of
truth regarding a defendant's sanity.5 3 In light of the probative value of
psychiatric assistance, the Court stated that the risk of an erroneous reso-
lution is "extremely high '5 4 when psychiatric assistance is denied to an
indigent defendant.
In recognizing the existence of a constitutional right to psychiatric
assistance, the Court added that the "concern is that the indigent defend-
ant have access to a competent psychiatrist," not necessarily "a psychia-
trist of his personal liking or [an ability] to receive funds to hire his
own."'5 5  The Court explicitly left to the state the decision on how to
implement this right.5"
The Court also reached a similar conclusion in applying the due
process balancing test to the capital sentencing proceeding. The Court
noted that the interests of individual and state were identical, and that
the third prong of the test which deals with the probative value and risk
of an erroneous decision also required access to a psychiatric examina-
tion, psychiatric testimony, and psychiatric assistance at the preparation
52. Id.
The Court has commented, directly and indirectly, on the new significance of psychiatry in a
number of contexts. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984) (suggesting psychiatric assist-
ance may be necessary to a fair trial); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897 (1983) ("What is essen-
tial is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant
whose fate it must determine.") (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976)). Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982) (finding a right to habilitation for committed mental patients);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (psychiatric assistance probative in civil commitment proceed.
ings for children); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (psychiatric assistance necessary
since diagnosis "turns on the meaning of facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and
psychologists"). See also Matlock v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1236, 1243 & n.3 (6th Cir. 1984) ("The case law
is still developing on the scope of the constitutional duty to supply experts... . [But] [t]he need for
psychiatric experts in a case in which insanity is the only defense is obvious."); United States v.
Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1163 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasizing the "particularly critical interrelation
between expert psychiatric assistance and minimally effective representation of counsel").
53. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1095. See infra notes 132-52 and accompanying text.
54. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1096.
55. Id. at 1097.
56. Id.
57. Id. Although not stressed by the Court, it should be noted that the advice of a psychiatrist
is critical in the capital sentencing portion of a trial when evidence of future dangerousness is sought
to be introduced. Such predictions of future dangerousness are notoriously suspect, and thus suscep-
tible of being rebutted with effective cross examination, but only if defense counsel is knowledgeable
in the area. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 732-34 (1974); Ewing, "Dr. Death" and the Case for an Ethical
Ban on Psychiatric and Psychological Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing Proceedings,
8 Am. J. LAW & MED. 407, 409 (1983).
[Vol. 21:121
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stage of sentencing.18 Since the Court decided the case on the psychiatric
assistance issue utilizing the due process balancing test, the Court did not
address the equal protection and sixth amendment claims to psychiatric
assistance,59 or the constitutional claim involving Ake's drug-induced
competency throughout the trial.'
B. Chief Justice Burger's Concurring Opinion
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment and stated that the
facts and issues presented by Ake confined the holding, and that
"[n]othing in the Court's opinion reaches non-capital cases."" Accord-
ing to the Chief Justice, "[i]n capital cases the finality of the sentence
imposed warrants protections that may or may not be required in other
cases."
62
C. Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Justice Relmquist, the lone dissenter, stated that the facts of Ake did
not warrant the majority's holding.63 Specifically, Justice Rehnquist
noted: (1) The psychiatrists who examined Ake at the state hospital de-
clined to express an opinion as to Ake's capacity to distinguish right
from wrong at the time of the offense; (2) the Ake defense called no lay
witnesses to establish such a lack of capacity; (3) the state did not intro-
duce evidence of sanity, and therefore, Ake simply did not overcome his
initial burden of raising a reasonable doubt as to sanity; and (4) the facts
of the case, including the murder itself, the subsequent crime spree, the
forty-four page confession, and the first signs of mentally ill behavior
occurring six months after the offense, did not raise the reasonable doubt
as to sanity required to shift the burden of proof to the state. 
64
Justice Rehnquist also noted that the Court's holding with respect
58. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1097.
59. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
60. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1099 nn.12-13. See also supra notes 22 & 43.
61. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1099. Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion adds little to the major-
ity opinion except confusion since the majority opinion was obviously meant to cover non-capital
felony cases. The unfortunate result of the Chief Justice's comment may result in additional litiga-
tion on the scope of the constitutional right to psychiatric assistance.
The opinion asserts that the "actual holding" of the majority's opinion is confined by the ques-
tion presented initially by Ake which was accepted on writ of certiorari to the Court. Id. The tone
of the Chief Justice's remarks suggest that he considered the majority's test as qualitatively broader
than the test suggested by the questions presented to the Court.
62. Id.
63. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1100-01.
19851
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to the right to psychiatric assistance at the sentencing proceeding has
"even less support" under the facts because the testimony as to future
dangerousness was elicited on cross examination from psychiatrists
called by the defense.6" Justice Rehnquist argued that "all the defendant
should be entitled to is one competent opinion. . from a psychiatrist
who acts independently of the prosecutor's office.""
IV. LAW OF INDIGENT RIGHTS TO FORENsIc AssIsTANcE
A. The Supreme Court and Psychiatric Assistance
The Court first addressed the constitutional duty of a state to pro-
vide an indigent defendant with psychiatric assistance in 1953. In United
States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,67 the Court held that the state of Penn-
sylvania had no constitutional duty to appoint a psychiatrist for a pre-
trial determination of an indigent defendant's sanity.68 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court noted that the defendant had already been ex-
amined for sanity by one court-appointed psychiatrist and that was con-
stitutionally sufficient.6 9
Ten years later in Bush v. Texas,10 the Court accepted certiorari on
the issue of an indigent defendant's right to a psychiatric examination.
In Bush, the defendant was convicted of larceny and sentenced to life
imprisonment as a habitual offender after making an unsuccessful in-
sanity plea.7 ' At trial, Bush had requested an independent psychiatrist
or alternatively an examination at a state hospital.72 However, his re-
quest was denied. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found no error
in the trial court's denial.73 In a brief concurring opinion, Judge Morri-
son acknowledged the federal constitutional argument but refused to ap-
ply the negative implication of the Supreme Court's holding in Baldi to
find a right to psychiatric assistance under the facts presented in Bush.74
Three days before Bush was set for oral argument before the
65. Id. at 1101.
66. Id. at 1102.
67. 344 U.S. 561, 568 (1953).
68. Id.
69. Id. In his dissent, Justice Frankfinter noted that the court-appointed psychiatrist who testi.
fied at trial had himself subsequently been committed for an "incurable mental disease which de-
prived him of 'any judgment or insight."' Id. at 572.
70. 372 U.S. 586 (1963).
71. Id. at 586, 587.
72. Id. at 587.
73. 172 Tex. Crim. 54, 353 S.W.2d 855 (1962).
74. Id. at -, 353 S.W.2d at 858-59.
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Supreme Court, the Texas Assistant Attorney General filed a supplemen-
tal brief with the results of a psychiatric evaluation of Bush.75 The evalu-
ation revealed that Bush suffered from "simple schizophrenia" and "was
only partly or not at all responsible for his acts ... 76 Upon the repre-
sentations of the Assistant Attorney General that Bush would receive a
new trial, the Court remanded the case to state court.7 7
In 1982, the Court in Eddings v. Oklahoma78 had yet another oppor-
tunity to reexamine its holding in Baldi. In Eddings, a sixteen-year-old
defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a po-
lice officer.79 In affirming the conviction and sentence, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the defendant's argument that he was
entitled to psychiatric assistance, citing Oklahoma precedent.8 0  The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case on other grounds with-
out reaching the psychiatric assistance issue. 1
B. Criminal Justice Act of 1964
The United States Congress responded to the indigency problem
through the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964.82 Section
3006A(e) of the Act as amended now provides:
[A] person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or
other services necessary for an adequate defense may request them in
an ex parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in an
ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the person
is financially unable to obtain them, the court, ... shall authorize
counsel to obtain the services.8 3
75. Bush, 372 U.S. at 587.
76. Id. at 588-89 (emphasis in original).
77. Id. at 589. When Bush was not afforded a new trial he filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking
release. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas first granted the writ of
habeas corpus and then a release after finding that Bush was denied a fair trial. Bush v. McCollum,
231 F. Supp. 560, 565 (N.D. Tex. 1964), a'd per curiam, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965).
78. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
79. Id. at 106-09.
80. Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
81. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 117. The Court reversed the trial court, holding that the trial court
had placed impermissible restrictions on the defendant's introduction of mitigating circumstances in
a capital sentencing proceeding when it excluded testimony concerning the defendant's family his-
tory. Id. at 112-17.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982). The intellectual impe-
tus for the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 came primarily from Supreme Court activity in the area of
indigent rights and the 1963 Report of the Attorney General's Commission on Poverty and the
Administration of Federal Criminal Justice. H.R. REP. No. 864, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 230, 235, 240,
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2990, 2994, 2999. See also Gideon v. Wainright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); and the then recently released Allen Report, REPORT OF ATr'Y GEN.'s COMM.
ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1963).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (1982). The amendment changed the three hundred dollar limit in
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The express purpose of the Act is to provide indigent defendants in fed-
eral court access to legal and nonlegal assistance "[to diminish the role
which poverty plays in our Federal system of criminal justice. 84
Section 3006A(e) requires federal courts to provide indigent defend-
ants with independent assistance upon a showing that such assistance is
"necessary to an adequate defense." 85 The "necessary" language has
proved to be the most critical portion of section 3006A(e).16 Federal
courts have interpreted the "necessary" language in a variety of ways.
For instance, some federal courts have held that one previous examina-
tion cannot be the basis for denial of independent psychiatric
assistance. 7
In reaching this conclusion the courts seem to interpret the "neces-
sary" language as being "reasonably" necessary to an adequate defense.
In application, the courts have expressed a variety of formulas for grant-
ing or denying additional assistance. For example, in United States v.
Chavis,8s the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals focused on
the prospects for a viable insanity defense and the sufficiency of psychiat-
ric assistance from other sources.89 In Brinkley v. United States,9 the
Eighth Circuit Court interpreted section 3006A(e) to be applicable under
circumstances where a defendant of means would have employed an in-
dependent psychiatrist.91 In contrast, other courts have interpreted the
"necessary" language to deny the appointment of an independent psychi-
atrist when the defendant has been examined by a court-appointed
psychiatrist.92
section 3006A(e) to allow compensation in excess of that amount for "services of an unusual charac-
ter or duration." Id. § 3006A(e)(3).
84. Letter from President John F. Kennedy to Speaker of the House John W. McCormack
(March 8, 1963); H.R. REP. No. 864, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 230, 234, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2990, 2993.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (1982).
86. See Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of Criminal Cases: The Constitutional and Statu-
tory Rights ofIndigents, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 574 (1982) (discussing the major problems being exper-
ienced under the Criminal Justice Act).
87. See United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Chavis, 486
F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1973). One common
problem with categorization of the many cases involving psychiatric assistance is the difficulty in
distinguishing between decisions which deny such assistance because of an inadequate showing of
need and decisions which deny assistance because the assistance is not necessary to an adequate
defense.
88. 486 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
89. Id.
90. 498 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1974).
91. Id. at 510.
92. See, e-g., United States v. Micklus, 581 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1978) (cumulative to other testi-
mony substantiating the defendant's defense).
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C. Forensic Assistance at the State Level
1. The Influence of Baldi
Many courts have interpreted Baldi strictly or have ignored it alto-
gether.93 Such an interpretation is justified for a number of reasons.
First, the issue of an indigent defendant's constitutional right to psychiat-
ric assistance was only briefly discussed by the Supreme Court majority
in Baldi. An analysis of the opinion in its entirety indicates that the
psychiatric assistance issue was only of secondary importance.94
Second, Baldi itself involves a unique fact situation which cannot
easily be expanded into a general constitutional principle for denying
psychiatric assistance. In Baldi, the defendant was examined by a psy-
chiatrist, and the psychiatrist also testified at trial. Moreover, the de-
fendant's counsel introduced pre-trial reports dealing with the
defendant's mental history.95
Third, and most fundamental, reliance on Baldi is inappropriate be-
cause the decision predates the tremendous changes in the criminal jus-
tice system which occurred in the 1960's. Indeed, Baldi was decided
before the Supreme Court began to apply specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights to states by incorporation through the fourteenth amendment due
process clause.
96
Assistance to indigent defendants was expanded significantly in the
1960's. In Gideon v. Wainwright,97 the Court held that an indigent de-
fendant charged with a felony in a state criminal trial had a sixth amend-
ment right of legal counsel. The status of indigent defendants was also
enhanced through the use of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.9" For instance, in Griffin v. Illinois,99 the Court held that an
indigent defendant could not be denied a free trial transcript that was
necessary to perfect a direct appellate review. Justice Black, writing for
the Court, reasoned that once the right of appeal was granted, a state
could not condition the exercise of the right on the defendant's ability to
pay costs because the ability to pay has no rational relationship to the
93. See, eg., State v. Taylor, 202 Kan. 202, 447 P.2d 806 (1968) (discussing the "inherent
authority in courts to provide a fair and impartial trial" as guaranteed by the Kansas Bill of Rights
and the due process clause).
94. Baldi, 344 U.S. at 561.
95. Id. at 566.
96. See W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 3, §§ 2.2-2.6, at 34-60.
97. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)).
98. See W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 3, §§ 11.1-11.2, at 473-89.
99. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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merits of the appeal. 1"°
Similarly, in Douglas v. California,' the Court held that the denial
of appointed counsel on the first appeal of right violated equal protection
guarantees. Subsequent Court pronouncements have stressed that abso-
lute equality between an indigent defendant and a defendant of means is
not compelled by the equal protection clause, but that a state may not
deny an indigent defendant "meaningful" access to the system.102
Recently, the Court has also stressed that constitutionally provided
assistance must be "effective." Thus, in Evitts v. Lucey, °3 the Court held
that the ineffective assistance of counsel on the first appeal of right vio-
lated due process of law.
2. State Practice
Although the Criminal Justice Act has foreclosed the development
of the law with respect to right of assistance in federal cases, most federal
courts dealing with state convictions through writs of habeas corpus have
recognized a constitutional right to assistance in some situations.'
0 4
Likewise, most states which do not provide forensic assistance by statute
have recognized such assistance as a constitutional right.'
The basis and scope of the constitutional right varies from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction. For example, in Williams v. Martin,10 6 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the state's refusal to provide an in-
dependent forensic pathologist to an indigent defendant in a murder case
violated equal protection, effective assistance of counsel, and due process
of law guarantees of both the fifth and fourteenth amendments.10 7 The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals utilizes a due process balancing test. In
100. Id. at 17-18.
101. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
102. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974).
103. 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985) (discussing the similarity between due process and equal protection
concerns in deciding that non-indigent defendants have a right to "eflective" counsel even though
the right to the appeal itself is of statutory, rather than constitutional, origin).
104. See, eg., Finney v. Zant, 709 F.2d 643, 645 (11th Cir. 1983) (mitigating circumstances);
Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir. 1980) (equal protection); Mason v. Arizona,
504 F.2d 1345, 1351-54 (9th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975) (equal protection).
105. See, eg., State v. Clemons, 168 Conn. 395, _, 363 A.2d 33, 38, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855
(1975); Pierce v. State, 251 Ga. 590, 308 S.E.2d 367 (1983) (equal protection); State v. Taylor, 202
Kan. 202, -, 447 P.2d 806, 809-10 (1968) (dicta); State v. Madison, 345 So. 2d 485, 490 (La. 1977)
(right to private investigator necessary for adequate defense); State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1261
(Me. 1983) (right to counsel); State v. Suggett, 200 Neb. 693, -. , 264 N.W.2d 876, 878-79 (1978)
(psychiatric only); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
106. 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980).
107. Id. at 1027.
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Matlock v. Rose,10 8 the court held that there was nothing "fundamentally
unfair" in denying the defendant an additional neurological and physical
examination at state expense when a state psychiatrist had already ex-
amined the defendant and there was little factual basis for the claim of
insanity.'0 9 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Beavers v. Balkcom" °
held that defense counsel's failure to pursue the issue of the defendant's
mental state at the time of the offense violated the sixth amendment guar-
antee of effective assistance of counsel."'
State courts which have recognized a constitutional right to forensic
assistance have likewise done so on varied grounds." 2 Most states base
the recognition of such a right on the due process clause." 3 The North
Carolina Supreme Court decision of State v. Tatum"' is typical in this
respect. The Tatum court stated "we adhere to the holding in ...
[Baldi]. However, we do not interpret Baldi to obviate the doctrine of
'fundamental fairness' guaranteed by the due process clause ..
States recognizing a right to forensic assistance generally construe
the right narrowly. These states require the assistance to be not only
necessary but "essential," and then available only after a "particularized
showing of need.""' 6 Moreover, the denial of such assistance is fre-
quently said to be within the "sound discretion" of the trial court judge
and not reversible without a showing of "substantial prejudice."' 17 In
reaching this conclusion state courts seem to be focusing implicitly on
the same factors that federal courts utilize in providing assistance under
108. 731 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1984).
109. Id. at 1243-44.
110. 636 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1981).
111. Id. at 116.
112. See, eg., State v. Clemons, 168 Conn. 395, 363 A.2d 33, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975)
(equal protection); People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966) (sixth amendment right
to compulsory process); State v. Campbell, 215 N.W.2d 227 (Iowa 1974) (sixth amendment assist-
ance of counsel); State v. Tatum, 291 N.C. 73, 229 S.E.2d 562 (1976) (due process).
In denying the assistance, it is often unclear whether the state court is holding that the re-
quested assistance is not necessary to an adequate defense, that there is simply no constitutional right
to such assistance, or that the defendant has made an inadequate showing of need.
113. Often the due process analysis is implicit in the denial that the requested assistance is re-
quired. Eg., State v. Peeler, 126 Ariz. 254, 614 P.2d 335 (1980).
114. 291 N.C. 73, 229 S.E.2d 562 (1976).
115. Id. at -, 229 S.E.2d at 567.
116. See, e.g., People v. McCrary, 190 Colo. 538, _, 549 P.2d 1320, 1327 (1976) (asserting that
if a constitutional right exists, the defendant must still demonstrate a particularized and reasonable
need by showing a lack of alternatives or some distinctive value to the trial); State v. Chapman, 365
S.W.2d 551 (Mo. 1963) (defendant must show the assistance is essential to due process).
117. See, e.g., State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1261 (Me. 1983); McKenzie v. Osborne, 640 P.2d
368, 374-75 (Mont. 1981); State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, -, 277 S.E.2d 410, 418 (1981).
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section 3006A(e) of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964.118
States have also provided forensic assistance by statute. The statutes
vary considerably from state to state. With a few exceptions, the statutes
do not distinguish between psychiatric and other types of assistance.1 1 9
Most statutes include assistance for trial preparation as well as investiga-
tions and presentation. 120 Many state statutes are modeled after section
3006A(e) of the Criminal Justice Act with its "necessary to an adequate
defense" language or its equivalent.1 21  A few of the state statutes have
strict monetary limitations1 22 or purport to apply only to capital cases.
123
The statutes also vary as to whether the expert is to be independent or
court-appointed.124
V. THE AKE ANALYSIS
A. Ake in the Oklahoma Court System
The Oklahoma district court was correct in interpreting Oklahoma
law to deny Ake any psychiatric assistance to pursue an insanity defense.
Although the Oklahoma Legislature provides psychiatric assistance to
indigent persons in civil commitment proceedings, 125 and to the prosecu-
tion in criminal cases, 26 there is no analogous statutory provision for
indigents in criminal cases.' 2 7 The trial court judge could not have au-
118. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
119. See eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. R. 3.216(a) (West Supp. 1985) (only one expert allowed) MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1985) (clinician).
120. See, eg., IDAHO CODE § 19-852a(2) (Supp. 1985); OR. REv. STAT. § 135.055(4) (1983).
121. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT. § 7.135 (1983). See also ALAsKA STAT. § 18.85.100 (Supp.
1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-80 (Law Co-op 1985) (contains only "necessary" language).
122. Se. eg., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-207(a) (1982) (maximum compensation of $500 in
non-capital cases); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(d) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (compensation
not to exceed $500); W. VA. CODE § 29-21-14 (e)(3) (Supp. 1985) (maximum compensation of $500,
unless defendant can show good cause).
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 originally authorized expenditures for expert services not in
excess of $300. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1964). The Act was amended in 1970 to authorize limited
reimbursement for defense counsel expenditures made without prior judicial approval and to allow
expenditures in excess of $300 if certified by the court as necessary to provide fair compensation for
services of an unusual character or duration, and approved by the chief judge of the circuit.
123. See, e.g., AIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4013 (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 113.3(d)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:163-1 (West 1985) (murder cases only).
124. Most states provide for reimbursement or compensation. Only a few states require court-
appointed experts, see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-852a(2) (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 19.2-169.1 (1983
& Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.16 (West 1985).
125. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, §§ 54.4, 56 (1981). In Oklahoma, to be committed in a civil
proceeding, the patient must be examined by two qualified examiners, including one licensed psy-
chologist. The examiners are entitled to a "reasonable sum set by the court." Id. § 56,
126. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 1304(b)(3) (1981). ("expert witnesses who appear on behalf of
the State of Oklahoma shall be paid a reasonable fee for their services from the court fund").
127. In counties with a population exceeding 200,000, an office of the public defender is author-
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thorized, even in his discretion, an independent psychiatric evaluation or
an evaluation at a state hospital because he lacked legislative authoriza-
tion or judicial approval to do so. As the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals has repeatedly emphasized:
State Legislators could appropriately provide impecunious defendants
with this aid if deemed practicable and in the public interest. In the
absence of enabling legislation, we know of no judicial precedent, con-
stitutional mandate, or statutory authority in Oklahoma obligating this
State, at its expense, to make available to the appellant, in addition to
counsel, the full paraphernalia of defense.
128
The state in Ake argued that lay testimony was a constitutionally
adequate substitute for expert psychiatric assistance, 129  and since
Oklahoma law permits lay witnesses to testify on the issue of insanity,
130
Ake's failure to call lay witnesses foreclosed any constitutional claim that
the state deprived him of the ability to raise the defense.13" ' Under
Oklahoma law, the premise that lay testimony is an adequate substitute
for expert psychiatric assistance is unrealistic for several reasons.
32
Although the testimony of lay witnesses on the insanity issue is per-
mitted under Oklahoma law, it is by comparison to expert psychiatric
testimony an inadequate substitute. Psychiatrists are considered by both
the public and legal community to be experts in the field of mental ill-
ness. The trier-of-fact may often attach greater weight and credibility to
the testimony of the psychiatrist than to the testimony of lay witnesses
because of the mystique commonly imputed to "experts."' 33 The psychi-
ized. OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 138.1 (1981). Under the public defender scheme funds are available for
investigators but not experts. Id. § 138.6.
128. Maghe v. State, 620 P.2d 433, 435 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980). "Until our Legislature sees fit
to enact legislation providing for such appointments, the trial courts are without authority to comply
with such requests." Hardt v. State, 490 P.2d 752, 756 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
129. Brief of Respondent at 28-33, Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985).
130. Wilson v. State, 568 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) ("a nonexpert witness may,
upon a showing of sufficient opportunity to observe, give his opinion as to the defendant's sanity").
131. Brief of Respondent at 28-33, Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985).
132. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized the special importance of psychi-
atric testimony. Cox v. State, 644 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) ("Psychiatric testimony
of the defendant's mental or emotional state at the time of the killing may very likely influence the
jury's decision. ... )
133. See A. GOLDSTEiN, THE INsANrry DEFENSE (1967).
[The prosecution will usually present its expert to describe as "normal" what defendant's
layman are characterizing as "abnormal"; the psychiatrist for the prosecution will be testi-
fying, with a ring of authority which no layman can duplicate, that the defendant "knew
right from wrong" or that he "knew the nature and quality of his act," or that he could
control his conduct.
Id. at 124. See also A. STONE, LAW, PsYCHiATRY, AND MORALrrY (1984). Discussing the adver-
sary standard and a psychiatrist's "ethical" responsibility, Stone asks:
But does the jury clearly understand this partisan role of the forensic psychiatrist? After
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atrist will be able to make comparisons, draw inferences, and otherwise
explain observations in a manner that is psychologically impressive and
persuasive to a jury.134 Lay testimony, by contrast, not only lacks the
psychological persuasiveness of expert testimony, but often will be
viewed as less credible because the lay witness will often necessarily be a
friend or family member of the accused.
The special burden placed on those who must rely solely on lay wit-
ness testimony is exacerbated by Oklahoma's restrictive insanity defense
scheme. 135  Oklahoma follows the "M'Naghten" or "right-wrong" test
for legal insanity. 136 Under the "right-wrong" test, the accused will be
relieved of all criminal liability if at the time of the offense it is clearly
proved that he was "labouring under such a defect of reason, from dis-
ease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong." 137
all, they watch as the forensic psychiatrist takes an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth,
and not the partisan truth. The psychiatrist does not begin by revealing to the jury that he
or she has been retained to make the best case possible. Rather, he or she is introduced to
the jury with an impressive presentation of distinguished credentials to establish expertise,
not partisanship or bias.
Id. at 72. Accord Lederer, Scientific Evidence-An Introduction, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 517
(1984) ("'Scientific evidence' has a ring of impressive probative force, a ring that would appear to
find a receptive ear in a public blas6 with technological achievement.").
134. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 133 passim.
135. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 152(4) (1981).
136. The "right-wrong" test was established in Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(1843). Substantially unchanged today, the test focuses on the cognitive capacity of the defendant.
See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
More recently, many jurisdictions have added a volitional component to their insanity defense
which provides that a defendant who knew that his behavior was wrong would nevertheless be excul-
pated if he could not control his behavior. See Block, The Semantics of Insanity, 36 OKLA. L. Rnv.
561, 564 (1983).
The widely-adopted Model Penal Code codified the "cognitive-volitional" test. The Model Pe-
nal Code provides that a "person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)(brackets in original, used to indicate
an option in the choice of words).
Prior to 1984, with the exception of the First Circuit, the federal courts of appeals adopted the
Model Penal Code formulation. After the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan and
the subsequent acquittal of the assassin, John W. Hinckley, on the grounds of insanity, Congress
responded by restricting the scope of the insanity defense. The Insanity Defense Reform Act of
1984, a component of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, changes the federal insanity
defense in three basic ways. The Reform Act codifies and adopts the "right-wrong" test for use in
the federal courts, shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he was insane, and amends Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to prohibit the
mental health expert from testifying as to the "ultimate" issue of insanity. Insanity Defense Reform
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 401, 402, 406, 98 Stat. 2057, 2067-68 (1984).
137. M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722.
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Oklahoma law also presumes that the accused was sane at the time
of the offense unless the accused raises a reasonable doubt as to sanity.
13 8
Once the initial presumption is overcome, the state bears the burden of
proving sanity beyond reasonable doubt. 139 The showing of reasonable
doubt required to overcome the presumption of sanity has been equated,
by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, with a showing of legal
insanity. Thus, as the court pointed out in Whisenhunt v. State,"4
"[u]ntil legal insanity was established there was not sufficient evidence to
create that reasonable doubt required by law to shift the burden. . . to
the state."' 4 ' In short, the court requires the accused to make a prima
facie showing that, at the time of the offense, the accused was, according
to the "right-wrong" test, legally insane. Then, and only then, will the
burden shift to the state.
Lay testimony is less probative than expert psychiatric testimony in
the determination of legal insanity under the "right-wrong" test. The
"right-wrong" test focuses on the cognitive capacity of the accused at the
time of the offense. Lay witnesses do not have the expert ability to ob-
serve a defendant's behavior and draw certain inferences regarding that
defendant's cognitive capacity. Thus, their testimony will have little pro-
bative value.' 42 For instance, in Oklahoma, testimony of a defendant's
erratic behavior at the time of the offense is largely irrelevant for insanity
purposes because the test focuses on the defendant's knowledge of right
and wrong.' 43
Expert psychiatric testimony, by contrast, is better suited to provide
a jury with adequate information to make a determination on the issue of
sanity. Psychiatrists profess to have an ability to fit behavior into a
138. Munn v. State, 658 P.2d 482 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). In Munn the court stated:
The initial burden is on the defendant to establish a reasonable doubt as to his sanity. Once
the defendant establishes a reasonable doubt of his sanity, the presumption of sanity van-
ishes and it is incumbent upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant could distinguish between right and wrong and was therefore sane at the time of
the offense.
Id. at 484 (citing Bills v. State, 585 P.2d 1366 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978)). See also Reed v. State, 23
Okla. Crim. 56, 61, 212 P. 441, 443 (citing Adair v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 284, 301-02, 118 P. 416,
423-24 (1911)).
139. See supra note 138.
140. 279 P.2d 366 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954).
141. Id. at 371.
142. Cf Tanay, The Expert Witness as a Teacher, 8 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 401
(1980). "The expert witness, through experience, acquires a sense of strategy in presentation of
scientific information to the fact-finders. Thus, the expert is not only a source of information on
technical content, but also an advisor on how this information can be best imparted to the fact-
findeks." Id. at 402.
143. See, eg., Garrett v. State, 586 P.2d 754, 755-56 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978).
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larger pattern of mental illness in such a manner as to shed light on a
defendant's cognitive capabilities at the time of the offense. The qualita-
tive differences between lay testimony given by witnesses and that offered
by psychiatrists would logically increase when the lay witness did not
observe the defendant's behavior at the time of the offense. Psychiatrists
will draw temporal inferences between behavior at the time of the offense
and behavior which occurred before or after the offense that lay witnesses
are either unwilling or unable to make.
Thus, the practical effect of limiting a defendant to lay testimony
under the Oklahoma insanity defense scheme is often to deny that de-
fendant the insanity defense. In Oklahoma, lay testimony alone is sel-
dom sufficient to overcome the initial burden of insanity. For instance,
in Wilson v. State,"4 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that:
It is not enough in a criminal trial for defendant to attempt to
merely raise some doubt as to his emotional or mental instability, or
even to offer proof that he is emotionally or mentally ill, as was done in
this trial. There must be other evidence or testimony to prove that
defendant did not know right from wrong .... 145
Thus, the testimony of a jailer which stated that the defendant was "not a
normal person," was "lacking in memory," and "communicat[ed]
unintelligibl[y]," which was corroborated by another jailer as well as by
the defendant's own behavior when he took the stand in his own defense,
was held not to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity. 146
In Bills v. State, 47 the defendant had been admitted and released
from a mental hospital four times within the five years prior to the of-
fense, but the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not find this, in
addition to other evidence, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to
sanity. 14 8 Moreover, the court held that the trial court is not required to
give a jury instruction concerning the shifting presumption unless the
trial court is satisfied that sufficient evidence has been introduced to re-
but the presumption of sanity.'49
In Garrett v. State, 50 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals up-
held the conviction of an eighty-year-old grandmother for murder. Tes-
timony by lay witnesses, who stated that the defendant looked "wild"
144. 568 P.2d 1279 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
145. Id. at 1281.
146. Id. at 1280.
147. 585 P.2d 1366 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978).
148. Id. at 1371-72.
149. Id. at 1372.
150. 586 P.2d 754 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978).
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and "berserk" at the time the offense occurred, was held to be insufficient
to establish that the defendant did not know right from wrong.'51 There-
fore, the court determined that the initial presumption was never
overcome. 152
In Ake, the state of Oklahoma conceded in argument before the
Supreme Court that, under some circumstances, psychiatric assistance
for indigent defendants might be constitutionally mandated.' 53 But, it is
clear from the treatment of indigent defendants in insanity defense cases
before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, that psychiatric assist-
ance would be denied under all circumstances. Denial of such assistance
under these circumstances suggest an unfortunate lack of regard for the
adversary system and the problem of indigency because, in practice, psy-
chiatric assistance is a prerequisite to any meaningful use of the insanity
defense. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals seems to have oper-
ated under the erroneous assumption that precedent and legislative inac-
tion diminished its obligation to provide each criminal defendant with a
fair trial.
B. Interpretive Problems with the Holding in Ake
The Supreme Court's opinion in Ake is sensitive to the theory un-
derlying the adversarial system and, potentially, could significantly im-
prove the quality of criminal trials and the reliability of verdicts in
indigency cases. The decision, however, is not without its interpretive
weaknesses in reaching its stated goals of providing indigent defendants
meaningful opportunity to use the insanity defense. In particular, the
decision raises two primary ambiguities which will no doubt spur
problems at the trial level.
1. Psychiatric Assistance Test
The first interpretive problem arises from the new psychiatric assist-
ance test itself. In Ake, the Court stated the new test as follows:
[W]hen a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at
the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the
Constitution requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist's
assistance. . . , if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one. 154
Thus, the critical question is: what must be established to manifest "a
151. Id. at 756.
152. Id.
153. Ake, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1097 n.9.
154. Id. at 1092 (emphasis added).
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preliminary showing that sanity is likely to be a significant factor at
trial?" The Court expressly gave no guidance as to the criteria needed
for a preliminary showing or exactly what constituted a significant fac-
tor.155 At a minimum the test will obviously apply under the factual
situation of Ake when: (1) The defendant's sole defense is insanity;
(2) the defendant's behavior in court is abnormal to the point where the
defendant's competency to stand trial is in question; (3) the defendant is
shortly thereafter found incompetent to stand trial and the psychiatrists
suggest institutionalization; (4) the defendant is subsequently found com-
petent for trial, conditioned upon the defendant being heavily sedated
during trial; (5) the examining psychiatrists give detailed testimony of the
severity of the defendant's mental illness less than six month's after the
alleged offense, and they suggest that the illness may have begun many
years earlier; and (6) the defendant has the initial burden of producing
evidence of insanity.'" 6
Unfortunately, the fact situation is such a blatant example of poten-
tial insanity that little guidance can be gleaned from the Court's enumer-
ation of the relevant factors. Initially, it might be noted, the use of the
insanity defense usually entails the defendant's admission of the actus
reus of the offense. Thus, in a practical sense, defense counsel's notice to
the court that an insanity plea will be pursued, standing alone, could be
considered a sufficient preliminary showing for the purposes of the Ake
rule.
The question presented to the Court by the defense counsel utilized
the phrase "seriously in issue" as qualifying language to the right to re-
ceive assistance.' 5 7 Section 3006A(e) of the Criminal Justice Act utilizes
the phrase "necessary to an adequate defense."15 The Ake Court implic-
itly rejected both phrases. Either phrase appears to require the trial
court to evaluate the merits of the defendant's insanity defense plea
before granting the psychiatric assistance sought. The phraseology used
in Ake with respect to a preliminary showing that sanity will be a signifi-
cant factor in the case also implicates the merits of the insanity claim, but
arguably to a lesser degree since under the plain meaning of these terms
155. Id. at 1099 n.12 ("We express no opinion as to whether any of these factors, alone or in
combination, is necessary to make this finding.").
156. Id. at 1098.
157. Id. at 1099 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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it would seem that sanity could be a "significant" factor and yet not be
"seriously" in issue or "necessary" for an adequate defense.
If a lesser standard of scrutiny is implied, the factors enumerated by
the Court regarding the preliminary showing with respect to the facts of
Ake should not be construed strictly since, for example, such a construc-
tion would defeat the underlying rationale of Ake when the defendant is
"normal" at trial but nevertheless insane at the time of the offense. 159
Under a broad reading of the Ake test, these factors should be construed
as requiring a more generalized showing of mental illness, including a
history of mental illness.
A broad reading of both the Ake test and the Court's discussion of
the relevant factors under the facts of Ake is by no means a natural one.
In the hands of courts which disfavor the insanity defense or which oper-
ate under tight fiscal limitations, the Ake test may very well be inter-
preted narrowly. The lack of guidance is unfortunate because a more
generalized set of criteria could have been enumerated which would not
have impinged on a trial court's ability to eliminate frivolous pleas of
insanity.
2. Potential Conflict: The Partisan Psychiatrist
The second interpretive problem arises from the potential contradic-
tion between the Court's desire that the state provide one competent psy-
chiatrist and the Court's implicit suggestion that the psychiatrist be an
active member of the defense. The Court is unclear as to the exact nature
and scope of the substantive right it has created. The exact nature and
scope of the substantive right will necessarily have important conse-
quences on the adequacy of any statutory scheme designed to implement
the right.
The Court made three basic statements which defined the parame-
ters of the problem: (1) The state must provide access to a "competent
psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense;" (2) the indigent
defendant does not have a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of
his own liking or to receive funds to hire his own; and (3) as in the case of
the provision of counsel, the Court left to the states the decision on how
159. Mental disease, like physical disease, develops through different stages. After an acute pe-
riod of disorder, a mentally ill person may completely recover, or the disease may go into a residual
phase where there is an apparent recovery. In the residual phase subtle signs of the disease may
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to implement this right. 'I
Certain aspects of the Court's decision suggest that the right created
was that of a psychiatric defense advocate. First, the Court stressed the
importance of psychiatric assistance within the adversary system of adju-
dication.' 61 Moreover, this implies that the psychiatrist's role should be
to make the most effective case for his client. Second, the Court made
the analogy to right of counsel cases when it left to the states implemen-
tation of the right to psychiatric assistance. 62 Again, this would suggest
that the position of an advocate was contemplated. Third, the Court
expressly mentioned that assistance encompassed not only a pre-trial ex-
amination but also the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the
defense. 6 ' From a pragmatic standpoint, it is clear that most psychia-
trists who become substantially involved at the preparation stage of trial
would be unable to maintain a position of neutrality. 6' Finally, Justice
Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, interpreted the majority opinion as
yielding a right to a partisan psychiatrist. 65
Conversely, the requirements of the Ake test could be interpreted to
encompass a more limited type of participation by the psychiatrist. For
example, the Court expressed concern that the defendant be afforded "a
competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and
assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense."' 66
This moderate language, considered along with the lack of an express
obligation for a psychiatrist to act as an advocate, could possibly be con-
strued so as to require only access to and limited interaction with a psy-
chiatrist. This type of assistance is further implied by the Court's express
rejection of the notion that a defendant has a constitutional right to "a
psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own."' 167
The tension between these two possible interpretations of the nature
160. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1097.
161. By organizing a defendant's mental history, examination results and behavior, and
other information, interpreting it in light of their expertise, and then laying out their inves-
tigative and analytic process to the jury, the psychiatrists for each party enable the jury to
make its most accurate determination of the truth on the issue before them.
Id. at 1096.
162. Id. at 1093-94.
163. Id. at 1097.
164. See Goodman, Can the Medical Expert be Unbiased and Impartial?, LEGAL ASP. OF MED.
PRAC., June 1982, at 1. "In the past, the 'expert' was one who was accused of violating the 'conspir-
acy of silence.' Today he is often called a medical-legal expert, a medical-legal consultant, even a
hired gun. ... or perhaps an itinerant medical-legal prostitute." Id.
165. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1101-02 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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and scope of the right to psychiatric assistance will only be a problem
where a state statutory scheme implements the right to psychiatric assist-
ance through a state hospital rather than through a reimbursement or
court-appointment plan.168 The state hospital option creates at least
three distinct problems, each relating to the requirement that a psychia-
trist assist in the preparation of the defendant's case. The problems will
emerge regardless of the interpretation given to the right to assistance,
although the severity of the problem will become increasingly pro-
nounced if comprehended as an adversarial right.
First, the state hospital option presents logistical difficulties for the
implementation of the trial preparation assistance right. If the place of
trial is a great distance from the state hospital, contact between defense
counsel and the psychiatrist would likely be minimal and thus potentially
inadequate. A second problem is that state hospitals are notoriously
overcrowded, and hence there is a risk that the psychiatrist will not
spend an adequate amount of time with the defendant so as to become
intimately familiar with the case and its peculiarities.1 69 A constitutional
right to trial assistance has historically required "effective assistance,"
and the Ake decision in no way suggests a les§ exacting standard for psy-
chiatric assistance. 170 Finally, since state hospitals usually employ clini-
168. One can assume that defense counsel will utilize a psychiatrist's expertise to the fullest
extent possible since lawyers generally are unable to cope with the complexities of psychiatry. See
Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment" Training Attorneys to Cope with Expert Testi-
mony, 2 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1978); Poythress, Mental Expert Testimony, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
201 (1977).
169. See, eg., Ennis & Litwack, supra note 57, at 723-24 ("[Ilt is no less natural for an allegedly
mentally ill individual to appear agitated one day and composed the next. Consequently, the timing
of a prospective patient's examination may substantially influence the diagnosis .... ").
170. In Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523 (11th Cir. 1985), which cites Ake for support, the court of
appeals upheld a district court's holding that:
[I]in a capital case, a defendant whose sanity at the time of the alleged crime is fairly in
question, has "at a minimum the constitutional right to at least one psychiatric examina-
tion and opinion developed in a manner reasonably calculated to allow adequate review of
relevant, available information, and at such a time as will permit counsel reasonable oppor-
tunity to utilize the analysis in preparation and conduct of the defense."
Blake, 758 F.2d at 528 (emphasis in original).
In Blake, the trial court ordered a psychiatric examination, and the defendant was examined at
a state hospital in accordance with the policy for examining indigent defendants in the county in
which he was to be tried. At trial, the psychiatrist who examined the defendant testified that he
could not give an opinion on the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense since the defendant
claimed no memory of the incident. Although the state had a handwritten letter and a taped confes-
sion, neither were provided to the psychiatrist or the defense counsel. Id. at 527-28.
In holding that the defendant was denied his constitutional rights, the court stated that the
psychiatrist, when made available through a state hospital, must make reasonable efforts to examine
the defendant, or be provided with an alternative means of determining the defendant's condition, so
that an opinion can be formulated. Id. at 530. The court analyzed the defendant's ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claim according to the standards stated in United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039
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cally-oriented psychiatrists rather than forensically-oriented
psychiatrists,171 the ability of a state hospital to provide effective assist-
ance for trial preparation would be seriously diminished. Forensic psy-
chiatrists possess a knowledge of both law and psychiatry that clinical
psychiatrists lack by definition.172 The problems with the state hospital
option may or may not rise to a level of constitutional impermissibil-
ity.1" However, even if the state hospital option is constitutionally ade-
quate in most respects, it may nevertheless be undesirable as policy
because it effectively deprives one adversary of the means with which to
fully present evidence.
C. Ake as Precedent and Policy
Notwithstanding any interpretive problems with the new Ake test,
Ake will undoubtedly have a direct influence on the criminal justice sys-
tem and future development of law in the area of expert assistance.
Aside from signaling to lower courts a continued sensitivity to the qual-
ity of criminal trials, Ake also represents policy in terms of costs and
benefits to the criminal justice system as a whole. The costs of providing
psychiatric assistance to indigent defendants is arguably minimal. The
insanity defense is seldom pled despite public perception to the contrary.
As the National Commission on the Insanity Defense has stated, a con-
sensus exists among those experts who deal with the insanity defense and
who have conducted empirical analyses of the phenomenon that the in-
sanity defense receives exaggerated attention within the media, the legis-
latures, and professional literature.174 Furthermore, since the Federal
(1984), recognizing it was the state's actions not those of the defense counsel that deprived the
defendant of meaningful assistance. The court found that the defendant was completely deprived of
the right "'to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial test-
ing,' " thus making the trial results presumptively unreliable. Id. at 532 (citing Cronic, 104 S. Ct. at
2047).
171. See, eg., Rogers, Dolmetsch, Wasyliw & Cavanaugh, Scientific Inquiry in Forensic Psychia-
try, 5 INT'L J. OF L. & PSYCHIATRY 187 (1982) ("The field of forensic psychiatry and psychology is
merging as a new scientific speciality .... [lit is the study of a human artifact. . . which involves
the interface of law and human behavior with conceptualizations of psycholegal issues.").
172. See Tanay, supra note 142, at 402 ("The forensic expert is not only knowledgeable in his
particular scientific discipline, he also, invariably, accumulates considerable legal information. The
expert is grossly underutilized as a source of information of purely legal issues.").
173. Even in the area of ineffective assistance of legal counsel, the Court has required the defend-
ant to show with reasonable probability that but for the marginal representation the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2067-68 (1984).
174. NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N, MYTHS AND REALITIES: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSa 15 (1983). Although no national figures exist, evidence
presented to the commission on the use of the insanity defense indicates that, for instance, in Vir-
ginia less than one percent of all felony cases involve the insanity defense. Id.
[Vol. 21:121
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Government and most states already provide some psychiatric assist-
ance,175 the additional costs of Ake-type assistance would be increased
only marginally.
By contrast, the benefits of Ake-type assistance to the criminal jus-
tice system as a whole are very significant. The decision provides gui-
dance to lower courts for the uniform application of psychiatric
assistance to indigent defendants and Ake assists in filling the equal pro-
tection gap created by indigency within the criminal justice system.'76
Lastly, providing psychiatric assistance to indigents will arguably en-
hance the reliability of verdicts by supporting the truth-finding function
of the adversary system.
Ultimately, the most significant aspect of Ake may be its influence
on alleged constitutional rights with respect to other types of expert
assistance. The Court's reliance on a due process analysis, and its em-
phasis on providing defendants with the "basic tools" for developing an
adequate defense, logically raise the question of what other types of ex-
pert assistance might also be constitutionally mandated.
The Ake opinion suggests several reasons why the holding could be
limited to psychiatric assistance only. First, the use of a due process
balancing test is significant in itself. The indigency/expert assistance
problem implicates not only due process concerns, but also equal protec-
tion and effective counsel concerns.177 Ake could easily have been de-
cided on grounds other than due process. Yet, the Court chose to decide
Ake solely on due process grounds. Arguably, the reason that the major-
ity opinion commanded eight justices was that the due process analysis
allows the most flexible approach with which to fashion the scope of the
right in future situations. This rationale is further supported by the
Court's use of Mathews v. Eldridge178 and Little v. Streater179 as prece-
dent for Ake rather than the more analogous right to counsel and right to
transcript line of cases. 180 Indeed, Ake represents the first time that an
explicit Mathews due process balancing test has been applied to proce-
dures in a criminal trial proceeding.
175. See supra notes 83-127 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
177. See Comment, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense. Expert and Investigational
Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 632, 637-43 (1970) (constitutional consid-
erations include due process, equal protection, effective assistance of counsel, compulsory process,
and confrontation with witnesses).
178. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
179. 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
180. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
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A second reason for limiting Ake to psychiatric assistance is sug-
gested by the Court's heavy emphasis on the "special nature" of psychi-
atric assistance.181 Notwithstanding a short disclaimer by the Court that
"we neither approve nor disapprove the widespread reliance on psychia-
trists,"' 18 2 it is clear that the Court considered psychiatric assistance ex-
traordinarily important.1 83  In discussing the "enhanced role" of
psychiatric assistance, the Court elaborated at length on the special role
psychiatrists can fulfill for the defendant:
[P]sychiatrists gather facts, both through professional examination, in-
terviews, and elsewhere, that they will share with the judge or jury;
they analyze the information gathered and from it draw plausible con-
clusions about the defendant's mental condition, and about the effects
of any disorder on behavior; and they offer opinions about how the
defendant's mental condition might have affected his behavior at the
time in question. They know the probative questions to ask of the op-
posing party's psychiatrists and how to interpret their answers ....
[P]sychiatrists can identify the "elusive and often deceptive" symp-
toms of insanity. . . and tell the jury why their observations are rele-
vant. Further, where permitted by evidentiary rules, psychiatrists can
translate a medical diagnosis into language that will assist the trier of
fact. ... 184
Psychiatric assistance is unique in other ways not mentioned by the
Court. For instance, the use of the insanity defense, as mentioned earlier,
usually entails an admission of the actus reus of the offense. Therefore,
psychiatric assistance focuses on one element of the case which will
either exculpate or convict the defendant. In cases where insanity is not
an issue, admission of guilt is not normally required of the defendant and
the requested assistance is arguably less important to the success of the
defendant's overall case because the government's case will be supported
by other evidence besides that of expert witness testimony. Another dif-
ference between psychiatric assistance and other types of assistance is
that, unlike the physical sciences, the discipline of psychiatry contains
many competing "schools." Thus, psychiatric assistance at the prepara-
tion stage of trial is arguably more critical than the preparation in a case
involving physical evidence.
A final aspect of Ake suggesting that the majority opinion did not
imply an extension to other types of assistance is intimated by the
Court's silence on the matter. The majority decision is closely tied to the
181. Ake, 105 S. CL at 1095-96.
182. Id. at 1096.
183. Id. at 1095.
184. Id. at 1095-96.
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relationship of psychiatric assistance and its use in the insanity defense.
The Court never hints at the possibility that the Ake rationale could be
applied to other types of assistance. In light of the logical connection
between the various types of assistance and the state and federal legisla-
tive practice of not distinguishing between psychiatric and other types of
assistance,18 5 the Court's silence may well have been purposeful.
Whatever the Court's reason for limiting the immediate holding of
Ake, the decision will undoubtedly spur judicial activity in the area of
non-psychiatric expert assistance. The previously mentioned limitations
on the right to expert assistance that Ake may suggest do not make a
convincing argument for the denial of expert assistance as a general rule.
The Mathews due process balancing test utilized by theAke Court in
developing the right to psychiatric assistance would arguably support a
right to other types of expert assistance, too. Since the balancing ap-
proach involves a largely non-empirical, utilitarian weighing of interests,
the method is extremely flexible. 86 Yet, in view of the Court's character-
ization of the various interests in Ake, distinguishing psychiatric assist-
ance from other types of expert assistance in later cases will be very
difficult.
Under the three-prong due process analysis, the private interest in
the outcome of the adjudication is equally compelling regardless of the
type of assistance involved. Likewise, the state's interest remains essen-
tially the same. As the Court noted inAke, "a State may not legitimately
assert an interest in maintenance of a strategic advantage over the de-
fense. .. , "I7 Moreover, since most states do not distinguish between
psychiatric and other types of assistance when they provide assistance to
indigent defendants, it is unlikely that the costs of extending a constitu-
tional right to such additional assistance would be substantial.
18 8
The third prong of the due process balancing test focuses, on the one
hand, on the probative value of the additional assistance and, on the
other hand, on the risk of error if the assistance is denied. Under this
third prong, non-psychiatric expert assistance may be analyzed differ-
185. See supra notes 95 & 119 and accompanying text.
186. See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Elridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 45-46
(1976) (criticizing the Court's imprecision in weighing the various interests, and. suggesting a value-
based due process review).
187. Ake, 105 S. CL at 1095.
188. The Court does not explicitly make this point but instead focuses on Oklahoma's conces-
sion that a right would exist under the proper circumstances. Thus, the Court reasoned that
Oklahoma did in fact recognize that the financial burden is not always so great. Id. at 1097 n.9.
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ently. Unlike psychiatric assistance, other types of expert assistance will
not inevitably focus on a single essential element that may determine
guilt or innocence. The probative value of the expert assistance is less-
ened, absent such a focus, and the risk of error is decreased. 189
To illustrate the point, two hypothetical situations will be presented.
In the first situation, the defendant is also charged with arson and seeks
an expert to determine whether the origin of the fire is man made. In the
second situation, the defendant is also charged with arson. In addition,
the police have fingerprints, a chemical analysis showing gas on the de-
fendant's hands, and an eyewitness who will testify that the defendant
was at the scene of the fire. The defendant seeks an expert to attack any
one of the three pieces of evidence.
Obviously, the first situation is analogous to that of a defendant
seeking psychiatric assistance. If the defendant can show by means of an
expert that the fire is the product of natural causes, the defendant will be
exculpated. The assistance is highly probative and the risk of error is
great. By contrast, under the second situation the defendant's successful
attack of any one of the three types of evidence will not conclusively
exculpate the defendant. The probative value and risk of error is corre-
spondingly decreased.
It is impossible to predict how the difference between psychiatric
assistance and other expert assistance will weigh in the Court's analysis.
The Court may decide to retain a constitutional distinction between psy-
chiatric and other types of assistance. Such a holding would be unfortu-
nate if it were to be based on a consideration of psychiatric assistance as a
monolithic entity. A better approach would be to provide non-psychiat-
189. An argument could also be made that, in most cases, one competent non-psychiatric foren-
sic expert called by the prosecution would be sufficient to reduce the risk of error to constitutionally
acceptable levels because non-psychiatric forensic testing is more "scientific" and thus more reliable.
A central assumption of such an argument is that the testing in fact will be conducted competently.
At least one study seriously undermines this assumption. The Law Enforcement Assistance Admin-
istration (LEAA), in cooperation with the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice, sponsored a proficiency study of forensic laboratories in the United States and Canada. J
Peterson, E Fabricant, K Field & J. Thorton, Laboratory Proficiency Testing Research Program
(unpublished study of the National Inst. of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration, Dep't of Justice, 1978). This study was not publicly disseminated
by the LEAA, but was obtained and published by the National College for Criminal Defense. NA-
TIONAL COLLEGE FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE, RESULTS OF THE LABORATORY PROFIcIENcY TEST-
ING RESEARCH PROGRAM (1979).
Approximately 240 forensic laboratories participated, each laboratory was assured anonymity
and was notified when it was being tested. The following table, reproduced from the LEAA study,
indicates that the reliability of even traditional forensic testing is seriously open to question:
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rie assistance on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration the impor-
tance of the requested assistance for the fair adjudication of the case.
D. Recommendations
Inasmuch as Ake modifies existing judicial and statutory law on the
subject of an indigent defendant's right to psychiatric assistance, the leg-
islatures of the various states must reassess their previous policies in the
area and implement the right mandated by Ake accordingly.
Compelling reasons exist for a careful and reasoned evaluation of
the implementation of the right to psychiatric assistance. Ideally, any
implementation scheme should tailor the right to psychiatric assistance
to the realities of the modem criminal trial. On the one hand, psychiatric
assistance does, as the Ake Court noted, play an "extraordinarily en-
PERCENTAGES OF LABORATORIES REPORTING RESULTS OF "UNACCEPTABLE
PROFICIENCY"
Number "unacceptable" responses
Number of laboratories responding with data
Number of Labs Number of % of Laboratories
Sample Responding "Unacceptable" Submitting
Number Sample Type With Data Responses "Unacceptable" Responses
1 Drugs 205 16 7.8%
2 Firearms 124 35 28.2%
3 Blood 158 6 3.8%
4 Glass 129 6 4.8%
5 Paint 121 24 20.5%
6 Drugs 181 3 1.7%
7 Firearms 132 7 5.3%
8 Blood 132 94 71.2%
9 Glass 112 35 31.3%
10 Paint 111 57 51.4%
11 Soil 93 33 35.5%
12 Fibers 120 2 1.7%
13 Physiological 129 (A) 3 (A) 2.3%
Fluids (A&B) (B) 2 (B) 1.6%
14 Arson 118 34 28.8%
15 Drugs 143 26 18.2%
16 Paint 103 35 34.0%
17 Metal 68 15 22.1%





19 Wood 65 14 21.5%
20 Q.D. (A&B) 74 4 (A) 5.4%
14 (B)18.9%
21 Firearms 88 12 13.6%
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hanced role"' 190 in the criminal justice system. Because that system is
adversarial, the right to psychiatric assistance can and should be imple-
mented to enhance rather than ignore the adversary process.
On the other hand, psychiatric assistance has limitations in a crimi-
nal trial. The ideal implementation scheme must take these specific
problems into account because psychiatry is at best only quasi-scien-
tific, 19 1 and impartiality cannot be assured if the psychiatrist is to act as a
defense advocate. Indeed, the problem of "expert shopping" raises seri-
ous questions about the continued role of psychiatrists in criminal trials.
1. Problems with the "Impartial" Psychiatrist
The concept that psychiatrists are impartial scientific experts has
been thoroughly explored in recent years.192 The subtle but persistent
influence of extra-scientific factors in psychiatric evaluation is well docu-
mented. 9 Among the "subjective" factors which influence impartiality
are the location of the examination, 194 the timing of the examination, 195
the duration of the examination,196 the training and experiences of the
examiner,197 the personal values of the examiner,' 98 and the class and
190. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1098.
191. [The] assumption of expertise rests upon two further assumptions: that psychiatrists
are able to reach conclusions that are reliable, that is, that other psychiatrists would agree
with those conclusions; and that those conclusions are valid, that is, that they accurately
reflect reality. Unfortunately, judges and legislators are not aware of the enormous and
relatively consistent body of professional literature questioning the reliability and validity
of psychiatric evaluations and predictions.
Ennis & Litwack, supra note 57, at 695. See also Rogers, Dolmetsch, Wasyliw, & Cavanaugh, supra
note 171, at 187 (discussing the methodological and epistomological problems in forensic psychiatry
and psychology).
192. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 57, at 696 (collecting relevant professional literature on
the subject of psychiatric expertise).
193. Id. passim; Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness" Science in the Courtroom?, 38
MD. L. REV. 539passim (1979).
194. See Zusman & Simon, Differences in Repeated Psychiatric Examinations of Litigants to a
Lawsuit, 140 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1300, 1303 (1983) (finding the interview setting to be best explana-
tion for differences among control groups).
195. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 57, at 723-24 (evaluation is an inadequate sample of a
patient's behavior since the one-time examination by the clinician is often tainted in that the clinician
perceives what he or she expects to perceive).
196. Id. at 724. ("limited amount of time usually available for a psychiatric evaluation may
combine with the psychiatrist's 'set' [suggestion] to perceive mental illness, thus resulting in over-
predictions of disturbance").
197. Id. at 721. ("[E]ach school of psychiatry has a different view of what mental illness is, how
it is caused, and how it should be treated."); Zusman & Simon, supra note 194, at 1303 (findings
suggest examiner's training and theoretical orientation affect the way an examiner considers
symptoms).
198. Pugh, The Insanity Defense in Operation:. A Practicing Psychiatrist Views Durham and
Brawner, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 87, 95-96 (discussing extraneous factors that affect some doctors'
decisions); Comment, supra note 9, at 582.
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cultural differences between the examiner and the patient.'99
The independent psychiatrist poses a somewhat more insidious
problem for the concept of impartiality."° One would expect "impartial-
ity" to be suspect in a situation where a psychiatrist is sought on the open
market since defense counsel might naturally select a psychiatrist predis-
posed by way of training, experience, and values towards the case at
hand. Moreover, the psychiatrist will be influenced by the economic in-
centives attached to a favorable diagnosis.
The court-appointed psychiatrist who is expected to assist in the de-
fense preparation is removed, to a certain degree, from the economic in-
fluences of the selection process. Yet, the court-appointed psychiatrist is
not immune from bias."' Once the psychiatrist becomes involved in the
case, he or she will tend to identify with the party he or she has been
appointed to assist. Continued interaction by a psychiatrist with either
the defense or prosecution will affect the neutrality of the psychiatrist.2 "2
When taken in conjunction with inadequacies in the diagnostic sys-
tem under which psychiatrists operate, the result of all these subtle influ-
ences is scientifically unreliable and scientifically invalid diagnoses.20 3
199. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 57, at 724-26; Comment, supra note 9, at 582 n.220. Cf
A. STONE, supra note 133, at 110 (discussing the social and racial bias that is built into the Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manuals (DSM-III) diagnostic categories).
200. See Zusman & Simon, supra note 194, at 1304 ("[Florensic identification.. . . [O]ccurs
when psychiatric expert witnesses become involved in a case about which they are initially neutral.
Through frequent contact with the litigants or their attorneys, the experts become involved with a
viewpoint to the extent that their examination techniques and evaluation approaches are subtly
influenced.").
201. See Reisner & Semmel, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: A Look at the Proposed Federal
Criminal Code Reform Act in Light of the Swedish Experience, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 753, 782 (com-
menting on the "institutional" bias of the "court-appointed" psychiatrist, the authors note that the
bias may be in the selection process itself or, in the case of a public psychiatric hospital, in the
dynamics of the institution).
202. See supra note 200.
203. See A. STONE, supra note 133, at 110 (commenting on the racial and social bias in DSM-
III). The information collected and analyzed in the study by Ennis & Litwack involved diagnosis
under the American Psychiatric Association's DSM-UI. The two major problems with the DSM-II
cited by the Ennis & Litwack study were: (1) Inconsistency of perception among diagnosticians and
assignments of different weights to the same symptoms, and (2) inadequacies of the diagnostic sys-
tem itself--excessively fine distinctions required, uncertain diagnostic criteria and the requirement of
choosing a predominant diagnostic category when none was clearly evident. Ennis & Litwack, supra
note 57, at 729.
In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association revised the DSM-II and published the DSM-III.
See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DSM-III: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980). Both of the problems cited by Ennis & Litwack have been
dealt with to some degree in the DSM-III. First, each disorder has precisely stated categories with
diagnostic criteria that must be met before the disorder can be attributed to a patient. Second, the
DSM-III uses a multiaxial system so that no single symptom allows an immediate diagnosis to be
made. Third, DSM-III uses the residuals categories of "diagnosis deferred," "provisional diagno-
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The situation is further complicated because psychiatrists are typically
asked to answer scientifically invalid questions of knowledge such as
"wrongfulness" or "future dangerousness. ' '204
2. Adversarial Implications
In a system of adjudication which leaves to the adversaries the re-
sponsibility of presenting evidence and testing the soundness of the op-
posing party's evidence, and which also assumes that each party's
witnesses will be biased, the partisan psychiatrist seems to present no
major difficulties. However, just as the adversary system cannot condone
perjury by lay witnesses and courts often restrict unreliable testimony,
psychiatric testimony can legitimately be limited to situations which do
not undermine its truth-finding function.
In view of Ake and the enhanced role of the psychiatrist mandated
by the decision, the author of this Note advocates a few practical legisla-
tive suggestions:
(a). The initial evaluation and trial preparation for the indigent de-
fendant should be done by a forensic psychiatrist acting as an advocate for
his patient. Under this scheme, the defense psychiatrist would determine
the viability of the insanity defense, cooperate in developing a trial strat-
egy, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of any other psychiatrists who
are participating in the case, and prepare defense counsel for rigorous
cross examination. Since the psychiatrist would be a forensic specialist,
the aforementioned duties could be performed effectively. A forensic
psychiatrist should also be available to the prosecution for essentially the
same reasons.
20 5
(b). If the defendant chooses to plead the insanity defense, he should
sis," and "unspecified mental disorder" in the event that a patient's symptoms do not meet diagnos-
tic criteria. See R. LEvY, supra note 159, at 5-12.
204. Committee on Psychiatry & the Law Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, in BY REA-
SONS OF INSANITY ESSAYS ON PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (L. Freedman ed. 1983) ("[t]here is no
developed scientific method of determining the existence of such knowledge of the nature and quality
or the right and wrong as related to an act, or the lack of it"); Harding & Adserballe, Assessments of
Dangerousness Observations in Six Countries, 6 INT'L J. OF L. & PSYCHIATRY 391 (1983) which
provides:
Dangerousness is routinely and assiduously assessed in the countries where the study was
carried out, both in forensic psychiatric work preparing court reports and in compulsory
admission procedures for mental hospitals. The assessments are often well documented but
scientific and actuarial bases for such assessments are by no means clear.
Harding & Adserballe, supra, at 398.
205. Since the forensic psychiatrist would be considered an advocate by all participants, the
biases associated with a psychiatrist being consistently in the defense camp or the prosecution camp
are eliminated. Indeed, psychiatrists could be drawn indiscriminately from a pool of forensic psychi-
atrists by either side without fear of getting a biased perspective.
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be examined by at least two randomly selected non-forensic psychiatrists
who are not affiliated with either the prosecution or the defense.20 6 This
suggestion will tend to minimize the bias problems by eliminating eco-
nomic incentives and psychological attachments. Moreover, since the
psychiatrists are selected at random and are not directly connected with
the criminal justice system, professional and institutional biases would
also be minimized.
(c). At trial, only the non-forensic psychiatrists should be qualified
to testify, and they should not be allowed to testify as to the "ultimate fact"
of legal insanity.2" 7 Under this scheme, the non-forensic psychiatrist
would present and explain the diagnosis he or she reached. He or she
would have to testify around the ultimate issue of legal insanity by dis-
cussing the severity of the mental illness, if any, and its symptoms and
the symptoms' effects on the defendant's cognitive and volitional capabil-
ities. Prosecution and defense counsel, each tutored by their forensic
psychiatrists, would then probe the strengths and weaknesses of the testi-
mony as best suits the theories of their cases. The issue of insanity would
ultimately be left to the jury. In sum, these three suggestions would fur-
ther the adversary system and enhance the truth-finding function of the
system as a whole.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ake is a product of twentieth century American jurisprudence. Due
process has provided continued compensation for anomalies created by
the condition of indigency in the traditional justice system. While Ake is
qualitatively superior to the outdated holding and rationale of Baldi, the
decision leaves many unanswered questions.
The Ake decision is unnecessarily vague and the lack of explicit cri-
teria for determining the scope of the right to psychiatric assistance is
unfortunate. Courts operating under tight fiscal restraints and crowded
dockets may construe Ake in an unjustifiably narrow manner by engag-
206. The major problem with this suggestion is that now four psychiatrists instead of two would
be needed. However, the costs would not be that much higher because each psychiatrist would be
providing less assistance in terms of the whole case, and therefore his fee should be correspondingly
lower. Moreover, there is no substantial overlap between the functions performed by each type of
psychiatrist.
207. This suggestion is consistent with the recent change in Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See supra note 136. The propriety of admitting opinion testimony concerning the "ulti-
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in-g in arbitrary distinctions based on the facts of Ake rather than on the
foundational policies contained in the decision.
Moreover, Ake touched upon fundamental questions involving the
use of science in the courtroom. These questions include the problem of
the partisan expert and problems of scientific truth within the adversarial
context. Finally, Ake will undoubtedly have a significant influence on the
future of expert assistance in areas of law analogous to psychiatry. In-
deed, Ake may prove to be the seminal case for the development of a
generalized body of law dealing specifically with forensic assistance to
indigent defendants. The ultimate direction of the changes promulgated
by Ake will be determined in large part by the willingness of states to
engage in the contradictory goals pursued within the criminal justice
system.
Blake Champlin
Editor's Note: In response to Ake, the Oklahoma Legislature has recently
provided for the payment of expert witnesses. See title 22, section 1176,
of the Oklahoma Statutes. Section 1176, however, is expressly limited to
capital punishment cases. Apparently, the Oklahoma Legislature inter-
preted Ake narrowly-seizing perhaps upon the brief concurring opinion
of Chief Justice Burger.
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